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Will Bulgaria Fall a Victim of Its 
Democracy? 
By Krassen Stanchev 
 
Bulgaria held general elections last 
Saturday, June 16.  Two months before she 
signed EU Accession Treaty to formally join 
the Union with Romania on January 1, 2007.  
It still needs to enhance the rule of law, fix 
the user system for agriculture subsidies and 
enforce technical and environment 
standards.  The Treaty envisages a delay of 
one year if conditions aren’t met.  The 
country is closing its 1970-1980’s nuclear 
reactors.  Rushing into the Union, the 
government failed negotiating grace periods 
that, according to industries, are mostly 
needed in the area of environment and the 
entry costs are higher than for 2004 
members.  The economy grows steadily at 
5% a year.  The democracy is e stable; the 
former king, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
(69) won elections in 2001 and governs as 
PM. 
Besides the costs, 76 % of Bulgarians 
approve EU, want a better, less corrupt, 
more caring and less taxing government to 
lead them into the EU.  But they elected a 
parliament that would hardly speed up 
reforms, enhance prosperity and meet EU-
requirements.  Protecting themselves from 
imperfect politicians they run into a trouble 
of kicking themselves away from EU “safe 
havens.”  
 
 
Who won? 
The largest fraction is Coalition for Bulgaria 
led by former communist Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) – with 82 seats in 240-member 
legislature.  The party Bulgaria Muslims and 
Turks vote for (MRF) received 34 seats and 
promised a coalition (irrespectively the fact 
that Communist renamed Turks in mid 
1980’s).  This possible coalition is five seats 
short of 50+1 majority. 
The incumbent PM’s party (National 
Movement Simeon the Second, or NMSS) 
has 53 seats, i.e. 45% of what it got in 2001 
elections.  Another 50 seats are distributed 
between right-of-the-center parties, led by 
reformist ex-PM’s and former chief EU 
negotiators of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF), who, in 1997-2001 stopped 
the hyperinflation, privatized the economy, 
closed loss-making industries and set 
Bulgaria on prosperity, EU and NATO 
accession path.  One is the caretaker PM of 
March-June 1997, Mr. Sofiansky, who 
stopped the hyperinflation and set the 
conditions for recovery.  Then there is Mr. 
Kostov, 1997-2001 PM who brought the 
country back to the reforms track.  And 
charming leader of the United Democratic 
Forces (UDF), Mrs. Michaylova, Mr. 
Kostov’s foreign affairs minister hosting 
two-previous chief EU negotiators and the 
successful reformist ex-PM of 1991-1992, 
Mr. Dimitrov and ex-President Petar 
Stoyanov (1996-2001). 
To complete the picture, the remaining 21 
seats are held by the “Ataka” (Attack) 
Coalition (AC), a grouping that unites 
opportunists formerly belonging to BSP or 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
 
Economic Policy Review, issue 32, May - June 2005  - 2 - 
UDF or both, allegedly united by common 
origin from Communist secret police.  
Whatever the background, they want 
“Bulgaria for Bulgarians”, re-nationalization 
of “murky” privatizations, ban on MRF, 
immediate withdrawal from Iraq, exiting 
NATO, sending gypsies to labor camps, 
“beneficial” EU entry combined with hating 
the West and strong hand justice.  AC 
appeared on the stage six weeks before 
elections and won 8.5% of the vote, mostly 
from educated men of all walks of life fed 
up by political arrogance and hypocracy.  
Interestingly enough, in its critique of the 
EU Ataka borrows argument and 
publications from Libertarian think tanks, as 
it was the case with recent publication by 
Cato’s William Niskanen and Marian Tupy 
article on the draft Constitution 
The best of all worlds 
After successful start of reforms in 1991 (at 
the pace of Poland or the Czech Republic), 
BSP and MRF run the country via ad hoc 
majorities in 1993 and 1994.  Then they 
kicked out their own Muppet-executive and 
in 1994-early 1997 the Socialist governed on 
their own, with a comfortable 53 percent of 
the seats.  The result was regrettable; the 
country deteriorated to the group of poor 
reformers, mostly unfree countries 
(according to both the Fraser Institute and 
the Heritage/WSJ Indexes), the poverty rose 
four times and Bulgaria almost defaulted on 
its foreign debt in 1997.  Only the fiscal 
costs of 1991-1997 banking crisis were 41% 
of GDP.  The following table, which IME 
uses to monitor reforms in macroeconomic 
terms, gives an insight on how political 
parties contributed to the prosperity of the 
citizens
 
Indicators (average) 
1990-1997 
(Socialist influenced 
majorities, MRF 
including) 
1998-2004 
(Reforms led 
by non-
Socialist) 
2002-2004 
(Incumbent 
government, MRF 
including) 
Inflation (%) 210.1 7.5 4.8 
Inflationary tax rate (%) 57.7 6.9 4.5 
GDP growth (%)  - 4.7 4.4 5.0 
GVA growth (%) n.a. 4.0 4.9 
Investment growth (%) - 8.8 18.2 11.4 
Budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP) - 6.3 0.2 0.4 
Government debt (% of GDP) 168 65.9 48.3 
FDI (USD million, 1990-1996) 63.2 1,253.4 1,867.7 
FDI (% of GDP) 0.8 7.4 9.1 
Subsidies (% of GDP) n.a 2.1 2.5 
 
Then, the country was rescued by UDF and 
since 1998 enjoys its longest period of 
economic growth since 1911 (the eve of the 
of Balkan wars and the WWI).  UDF 
stopped inflation and economic decline, 
privatized the industrial sector and gradually 
built up investors’ confidence, and, 
according to the World Bank, reduced the 
poverty three times.  Needless to say, the 
process was far from perfect and everyone 
expected more.  The former king managed 
to sustain predecessors’ achievements, 
sealing EU and NATO prospects opened by 
them.  
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Originally, he wanted to please everyone 
with taxpayers’ money but the reasonable 
finance minister who teamed with IMF 
cooled down the spending zeal.  Taxes were 
reduced; the income raised 6% per annum; 
virtually the entire banking industry is 
foreign owned; only the gas and tobacco (the 
process was blocked by MRF) monopolies 
remain to be privatized, while the power 
sector sales have taken off.  There was and 
still is a consensus that Bulgaria is a success 
story, with reasonable growth, firm EU 
accession track record, sound money and 
profound fiscal stability, meeting all 
Maastricht criteria by 2009-2010.  Why then 
the electoral failure? 
Simply enough, Mr. Saxkoburgotski (the 
spelling is Bulgarian) is a victim of his own 
style of power-struggle.  In order to appeal 
to voters in 2001, he pained UDF the 
immoral and corrupt government, promised 
”decency and integrity in everything” and 
“sensible improvement of the living 
standard” in two years.  He also invited BSP 
and MRF to join the government.  But 
income improvements were visible only to 
those who read statistics.  The people 
witnessed, as usually happens, that for some 
living standard improvements are fast and 
sizable while for others - negligible or 
average.  The integrity promise failed due to 
lack of accountability, instances of 
embezzlement in public procurement and 
alleged kick back to family, friends and 
supporters.  Against this constellation all 
incumbents needed a scapegoat and a 
demon, to highlight own merits in 
comparison.  And the demon was found in 
the reformist camp of predecessors, they 
were prosecuted and harassed, the tales of 
their fortunes were leaked to the press.  
Hence, the election outcome: the Socialist 
image is embellished, with 40% less votes 
than in 1994 they are biggest faction in the 
legislature. 
Final countdown 
The election outcome is not the worst 
possible.  The BSP election rhetoric 
included scary ideas, like “the government is 
the master, the market is the servant”, 
skipping or amending the currency board 
arrangement, increasing government 
expenditures (currently 42% of GDP highest 
in New Europe) and taxes, return to 
progressive taxation (after it was 
significantly flatten: corporate is 15%, 
personal income – 10-24%) and “taxing the 
wealthy”.  These ideas are unlikely to 
materialize.  Probable common 
denominators in post-election policies are in 
line with low deficit, monetary stability and 
fiscal discipline.  
Given the election results, the Socialists 
need a third coalition member besides “the 
Turks”.  It might be the King’s or some of 
the right-of-the-center parties, although all 
of parties, except MRF, rejected openly 
BSP.  The Socialist-led coalition 
government might be informal, i.e. NMSS 
and/or others could support the cabinet in 
exchange for concessions.  Taxes will stop 
going down expenditures would rise.  The 
same growth rate prospects (5.8-6%) are 
under question, since domestic policy 
factors would coincide with lower industrial 
output in the first quarter, central bank 
measures to cool credit expansion, higher oil 
prices and slower pace in public investment.   
Bulgarian politicians are bad at joining 
efforts for common goal, which, in 2005, is 
meeting the 2007 EU accession deadline.  
The clock is ticking.  The political and 
economic impact of EU convergence has 
been unambiguously positive.  Bulgaria is 
benefiting from EU reform supervision and 
membership horizon renders confidence and 
stability, while the economy of scale boosts 
foreign investment flows.  This prospect is 
in jeopardy, due to elections.  It requires 
concerted efforts to pass number of laws to 
fix the judiciary and even change the 
constitution.  While Bulgaria was preparing 
for elections, Romania stepped up its 
accession effort.  Beside legislative job, 
Bulgaria needs efficient administration to 
implement already adopted acquis.  But 
today it is rather redundant and counter 
productive.  The country is already lagging 
behind Romania.  Evoking the 2008 clause 
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of the accession treaty seems inevitable.  At 
stake is the very prospect of joining EU. 
This prospect is not fully recognized and 
most coalition possibilities have 
questionable legitimacy. 
Left of the center coalition is the first to be 
attempted; it has two versions – with or 
without MRF.  Mr. Saxkoburgotski 
repeatedly rejects BSP-NMSS coalition as 
opportunistic but lead party members, e.g. 
the finance minister Milen Velchev, are on a 
different opinion.  Socialist face a reputation 
problem: their government were failing in 
the last 16 years, they would like to prove 
they are capable of ruling and they 
intensively searching for both coalition 
partners and credible provisional cabinet 
members.  BSP advantage is that as an 
election winner it has the President, Mr. 
Parvanov, on its side, elected in 2001 from 
its own ranks.  He would attempt lending 
helping hand, although his largely 
ceremonial constitutional powers are rather 
in time of political crisis.  MRF is an 
undesired teammate due to past instances 
and habits of blackmailing partners, but a 
three party coalition is somewhat more 
likely.  The next option is NMSS led 
coalition that cannot exclude MRF while 
center-right factions risk splitting if such 
talks start.  Any option contains a risk of 
failing and/or loosing political support if 
fresh elections are to take place. 
 
Year / period Prime minister Parliamentary Support President and affiliation 
1989 – January 1990 Georgy Atanassov BCP Peter Mladenov (BCP) 
February 1990 – 
December 1990 
Andrey Lukanov BCP/BSP Peter Mladenov (BCP) and after 
August 1990 - Zhelyo Zhelev 
(UDF) 
December 1990 – 
November 1991* 
Dimitar Popov BSP/UDF and other parties Zhelyo Zhelev (UDF) 
November 1991 – 
December 1992 
Filip Dimitrov  UDF (MRF until April 
1992) 
Zhelyo Zhelev (UDF) 
December 1992 – 
September 1994  
Luiben Berov MRF mandate, ad hoc 
majorities, except UDF 
Zhelyo Zhelev (UDF) 
September 1994 – 
January 1995* 
Reneta Indjova Caretaker PM (appointed 
by the president) 
Zhelyo Zhelev (UDF) 
January 1995 – March 
1997 
Zhan Videnov BSP Zhelyo Zhelev (UDF) 
March  – June 1997 Stefan Sofianski Caretaker PM Petar Stoyanov (UDF)** 
June 1997 – July 2001 Ivan Kostov UDF Petar Stoyanov (UDF) 
July 2001 – July 2005 
(?) 
Simeon Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha 
NMSS Georgy Parvanov (BSP) 
Notes:  
*Elections – October 1991 
*Elections – December 1994 
** Presidential election – October-November 1996 
**Presidential election – October 2001  
BCP – Bulgarian Communist Party 
BSP - Bulgarian Socialist Party (former BCP) 
UDF – Union of Democratic Forces 
MRF – Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
NMSS – National Movement Simeon the Second 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
Little prospect for outrageous populist policies Socialists in Bulgaria are more ideologically biased 
towards progressing taxation, government investment and 
pro-inflationary policies than any other party in New 
Europe 
BSP motivation to make difference from the times it 
governed in the 1990’s 
The ‘revenge” mood in BSP is very strong  
Most center-right parties have common 
economic/fiscal policy ideas – lowering taxes, 
sustaining fiscal discipline and stability 
No or virtually no common ideas between MRF/BSP on 
one side, and the rest of the parties on the other 
Any credible executives would be in the same camp Own reasonable economist in the Socialist camp have 
little political weight 
EU accession is a priority, the accession treaty is 
signed 
It is basically taken as access to EU taxpayers resources;  
Opportunities Treats 
Common policy denominators sustain the 
development path already proven successful by 
previous governments  
In rhetoric, BSP as the largest fraction is in almost 
complete disagreement with the 1997-2005 policy mixes 
There is a strong up trend in the economy, the 
country is resilient to external shocks, 
The currency is stable and the currency board 
arrangement works well 
A delayed EU accession, combined with enlargement 
fatigue and possible slow down in euro-zone demand 
could hit the long-tem stability of the Bulgarian economy 
(since it is still less flexible than those of 2004 EU 
members) 
EU accession deadlines force political parties to 
cooperate 
There is little tradition to work together, and the 
possibility of fresh elections limit the desire to join 
efforts 
By Autumn 2005 Romania would lead in the EU 
accession process 
EU public opinion on enlargement is uneasy, close 
fatigue; ratification will start after there is a government 
in place, and EU issues its monitoring report 
The president is from the rank of the winning party. The president voice and role would have a decisive 
weight if the newly elected legislature fails to appoint and 
elect a new PM and a Council of Ministers. 
 
 
 
Bulgaria Economic Development 
Dimitar Chobanov 
According to National Statistics Institute data 
for the first quarter of 2005 real gross domestic 
product (GDP) has increased by 6 per cent. 
These data are preliminary and will be revised at 
the end of 2005 but are good basis for analysis. 
Gross value added (GAV) increases by 7.1 per 
cent. The main contributor for this development 
is the industry with real growth of about 8.2 per 
cent and services add 7.4 per cent more value 
but the agriculture sector has shrunk by 1.7 per 
cent in real terms. 
Closer look at the industrial production data 
shows that the growth for the first quarter of the 
year has been decelerating after 2003 when it 
was 18.7 per cent and it was 14.8% and 11.1% 
for 2004 and 2005 respectively. This may hinge 
on seasonal factors because the growth in 
industrial production for the whole year has been 
rising after 2001. The annual growth has been 
2.2% in 2001, 4.6% in 2002, 14% in 2003, and 
17.7% in 2004. 
Growing part of the value has been added by the 
private sector which real growth is 12.7 per cent 
in Q1 2005 relative to 7.4 per cent in Q1 2004, 
while the public sector has decreased its value 
added by 8.6 per cent. Privatization of the state 
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owned enterprises is one of the major 
determinants of this development but on the 
other hand the number of employed persons in 
this sector has continuously risen. This means 
that this sector’s efficiency is even lower and it 
has become even greater burden for the whole 
economy. Larger public sector employment is 
actually deprives private companies of labor and 
money to pay bureaucrats’ wages. This impedes 
the economic development and is an obstacle to 
the real growth acceleration. 
The adjustments has been shrunk slightly (-
0.1%) differing from the last year data. Then, 
there was fast development in the financial 
sector, mainly the banking, which is accounted 
in this item. After the credit restriction measures 
taken by the Bulgarian National Bank it is 
logical the growth rates to decelerate which 
probably would take effect in Q2 2005. 
Therefore we could expect a moderate growth in 
2005. 
The main GDP components – final consumption, 
gross fixed capital formation, export, and import 
have also realized a real growth. However, 
higher growth of final consumption causes a fall 
in gross savings to GDP ratio after five 
consecutive quarters of increase. Savings are the 
source of investments in the economy, which 
share in GDP is relatively constant and this leads 
to a higher current account deficit and a 
financial account surplus because savings are 
actually imported from abroad. 
Growth of gross fixed capital formation has 
decelerated to 9.2 per cent in Q1 2005 from 22.1 
per cent in Q1 2004. This can be an indicator for 
slower economic growth in the next quarters 
because the trend during the last years is that 
lower investment growth leads to lower GDP 
growth. 
One should note that part of the positive 
economic development is determined by the 
monetary expansion through low interest rates 
kept by the European Central Bank. This has 
directed capital flows to higher return countries 
like Bulgaria. Although we cannot expect a 
change in ECB’s policy in 2005 this will happen 
later. Then, the economic growth would 
probably fall if the business environment has not 
changed positively by giving people more 
economic freedom. 
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria: Fiscal Environment and Taxes 
 
At the end of April 2005 the Institute for Market 
Economics published White Paper on 
Achievements and Challenges of Business 
Environment Reforms (with an Exclusive Focus 
on SME). It was prepared with the support of 
USAID Enterprise Growth and Investment 
Project, MSI—Bulgaria. We will present the 
paper in the Economic Policy Review. In the 
current issue we publish the chapter Fiscal 
Environment and Taxes. 
 
4.2. Fiscal Environment and Taxes 
 
4.2.1. Tax reforms 
 
In 1997 the corporate tax rate was above 40% 
and the top marginal individual income tax rate 
was 40%.  In most of the years since 1997 these 
direct taxes were lowered and this happened 
under the rule of two different governments.  In 
2005 the corporate income tax is 15% - one of 
the lowest in Europe1. In 2005 the dividend tax 
                                                 
1 Only five European countries has lower corporate tax rate 
was reduced from 15% to 7%.  Therefore, the 
corporate profit taxation is significantly reduced. 
 
In 2005 the individual income tax is between 10 
and 24% depending on the income. However, 
the social security tax is unchanged at the level 
of 42.7% (35% for sole proprietors), which is 
one of the highest in Europe.  Taking into 
account both social security tax and income tax, 
the conclusion is that the total tax burden on 
individual income for most of the people is only 
a little lower. 
 
The value-added tax is constant at 20%, but the 
other indirect taxes are increased every year.  
The reason is that Bulgarian government must 
impose the European Union minimum rates on 
excise duties before 2007 (2010 for cigarettes) 
when Bulgaria will become member of the 
union. In the next years the excise taxes will 
continue to rise.  As a whole, the consumption 
                                                                         
– Estonia (zero tax rate on reinvested profit), Montenegro 
(9%). Serbia (10%), Ireland (12.5%) and Cyprus (10% and 
15%). 
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taxes are increased substantially, both as rates and revenues generated. 
Tax rates in Bulgaria 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Corporate tax 28% 23.5% 23.5% 19.5% 15% 
Income tax 20-38% 18-29% 15-29% 12-29% 10-24% 
Social security tax 42.7% 42.7% 42.7% 42.7% 42.7% 
VAT 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Source: State Gazette, 2001 – 2004 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Fiscal redistribution 
 
Between 2001 and 2003, the consolidated 
government budget expenditures are maintained 
at a level of about 40% of the gross domestic 
product with a low level of 39.4% in 2002. The 
revenues are increasing, reaching a 41.7% of 
GDP – the highest level since the middle 1990s. 
 
 
Consolidated Budget 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Revenues (% 
of GDP) 
41.4% 39.8% 38.7% 40.7% 41.7% 
Expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
42.0% 40.4% 39.4% 40.7% 40.0% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
 
According to Eurostat, in 2002 Bulgaria’s fiscal 
burden was higher than any of the new member 
states with the exception of Slovenia.  But, as we 
mentioned above, 2002 was an exception with 
cyclically low fiscal burden. If we take data for a 
different year, Bulgaria has the highest tax 
burden among all the new member states.  And it 
is quite higher than the average fiscal burden in 
the new member states – about 40% in Bulgaria 
compared to below 35% average in the region.  
What is more, there is one country with lower 
than 30% overall fiscal burden. 
The consolidated expenditures in 2005 budget 
are less than 40%, but usually in the end of the 
year they are higher.  There are many 
expenditures in the budget that are not efficient 
and can be optimized.  The subsidies for loss-
making activities and similar budget 
expenditures account for about 2% of GDP.  The 
salaries of the budget employees are about 6% of 
GDP because the number of employees is much 
bigger than needed.  Maintenance expenditures 
are more than 6% of GDP and they are rising 
rapidly. Bulgaria has one of the highest defense 
expenditures in Europe etc.  
 
Fiscal Burden in new EU member states 
Country Total Fiscal Burden as 
% of GDP (2002) 
Slovenia 39.8 
Bulgaria 39.4 
Poland 39.1 
Hungary 38.8 
Czech 
republic 35.4 
Estonia 35.2 
Slovakia 33 
Cyprus 32.5 
Latvia 31.3 
Malta 31.3 
Lithuania 28.8 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
If the share of inefficient expenditures is 
decreased, Bulgarian fiscal burden can become 
much lower – in line with the low tax countries. 
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2005 ConsolidatedBudget Expenditures 
  BGN mln. % of GDP 
Total expenditures 16 262.6 39.3 
1. Non-interest expenditures 15 447.1 37.4 
 Current non-interest expenditures 13 402.6 32.4 
    Salaries and social security taxes 2399 5.8 
    Maintenance 2 613.2 6.3 
    Defence and security 1 632.2 3.9 
    Subsidies 746.5 1.8 
    Social expenditures 6 011.7 14.5 
     - Pensions 3 668.1 8.9 
     - social benefits, compensations 1 219.6 2.9 
     - healthcare fund 863.6 2.1 
     - other 260.4 0.6 
 Credits and temporary aid 100 0.2 
 Capital expenditures 1 594.9 3.9 
 Reserve 349.6 0.8 
2. Interest expenditures 815.6 2 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
4.2.3. Tax burden on sole proprietors and 
companies 
Sole proprietors pay social security tax and 
income tax on their income.  During the last 
several years the income tax was reduced.  
However, the social security tax rate remains the 
same and the maximum and minimum threshold 
for it was increased every year.  Thus, it is not 
surprising, that for most of the sole proprietors 
with income between BGN 1,000 and 1,800, the 
tax burden actually increased. 
 
Tax Burden and Income 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Law on Taxation of the Incomes of the Physical Persons 
 
Although the tax burden for the sole proprietors 
increased, they can reduce their tax obligations 
by reregistering as a Limited Liability Company, 
which pays a corporate tax. If they do that, they 
can save more than one third of the tax 
obligation. 
4.3. Taxes: public governance issues 
Since 2001 roughly 50% of publications and 
communications to the government by major 
business associations like BCCI, BIA and BIBA 
were dedicated to taxes, social welfare 
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contributions and related procedures.2   In this 
paragraph we try to explain why, irrespectively 
of tax reforms, the tax issue still deserves more 
profound attention, including from the point of 
view of the public governance. 
4.3.1. Who pays taxes? 
The demographics of taxation is such that few 
finance the many. 
1. Bulgarian citizens who produce income 
number 2.2 million (employed in public and 
private enterprises) or 33% of those above 15 
years of age.  The remaining 67% are net 
beneficiaries of redistribution and include 
pensioners, state and local administration and all 
employees paid by the budget (excluding non-
subsidized SOEs), the unemployed, and those 
who receive government stipends. 
 
Population above 15 years of age 
 Million. % of those 
above 15 
Employed by the private 
sector 
1.9 28 
Employed in government 
owned industries 
0.3 5 
Employed in government 
financed activities 
0.6 9 
Unemployed, students, other  1.5 22 
Pensioners 2.4 36 
Total 6.7 100 
Source: IME non NSI 2002 data on the population and 
2003 on employment.  
 
4.3.2. Taxing the middle class in 2001-2004. 
A Bulgarian, 30-40, working on a contract or as 
sole proprietor, who receives a gross monthly 
income of BGN 1,000, would encounter the 
following situation.  He/she should pay 29% 
(compulsory) pension insurance and 6% 
(mandatory) health insurance on BGN 850; in 
other terms he/she contributes to quasi-
government funds BGN 297.5.  The income tax 
on the remaining BGN 702.5 is BGN 149.  The 
remaining BGN 553.5 is for consumption.  
According to the MOF and NSI assumptions, 
he/she will spend 80% of this amount on VAT-
taxed products and services, i.e. another BGN 74 
                                                 
2 See the respective sites of BCCI - 
http://www.bcci.bg/bulgarian/law/apendix.htm (in 
Bulgarian); of BIBA - http://www.biba.bg/Publications.asp 
(in Bulgarian and English), and of BIA – http://bia-bg.com 
(in Bulgarian).  The growing public attention to taxes is 
linked to consolidation of revenues and tax reforms in the 
late 1990s.  The incumbent government increased 
expenditures while claiming that it is going to introduce 
different tax incentive.  
would go to the treasury.  If he/she drives a car 
and consumes 50 liters a month, excise duties 
would be BGN 22 and if he/she smokes and 
drinks as the “average” Bulgarian, duties are 
BGN 12.  What remains is BGN 445.  The 
calculation is not complete but choices must 
obviously be difficult since there are other 
options to invest, consume, and redistribute 
within the family, etc. 
Assuming that forecasted average wage for the 
year end is BGN 307, an ideal worker would pay 
(compulsory) BGN 32.77 insurance 
contributions; the employer – BGN 98.32.  On 
the remaining BGN 274.23 the employee owes 
income tax of BGN 34.30; his/her net wage is 
BGN239.93.  Employer’s costs are: BGN 
405.32. 
BGN--165.39 would go to the government, the 
remainder is squeezed out between employee’s 
actual work and what he/she gets from the 
employer.  The amount squeezed out in value is 
BGN 40.8%, i.e. the worker gets less than 60% 
of what he/she contributes to the economy.  
Presumably, either side of the contract has 
significant incentives to select non-compliance 
tactics.3  The FIAS 2004 survey of obstacles 
indicated just negligible improvement in the tax 
situation from 2002, as a result of the reduction 
of corporate tax rate, a reduction of the lower 
threshold for income tax and shortening of VAT 
refund deadlines by the time of the survey. 
The explanation is, perhaps, in the fact that taxes 
are perceived as a combined burden, including 
corporate and income tax, and the 
employer/employee social welfare contributions.  
(FIAS 2004 did not ask about the latter.)  The 
conventional wisdom is that it is very likely that 
social transfers to the budget hamper 
development of SMEs and individual 
entrepreneurs.  Our respondents made a point 
that it is not exactly true, and that it is often the 
case that “big tax payers” (corporations) suffer 
as well.  The mechanism they reveal is that they 
lose trained work force to competition  
Comparisons with neighboring countries are 
disappointing, even in relation to Serbia – a late 
reformer with a background of trade 
union/workers ownership of enterprises.4   
                                                 
3 Obviously, this is not a certain behavior but only an 
indication that there is a systemic issue. 
4 IME, Study of Incentives, Characteristics and Strategies 
of Firms Operating ‘in the Shadows’ (180 Firms Survey in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia), Sofia, IME, p. 34, available 
at:  http://www.ime.bg/pdf_docs/papers/_Toc71455348  
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Scale:  
- It is not a problem at all = 1 
- Insignificant problem = 2 
- Do not have influence = 3 
- Serious problem = 4 
- Very serious problem = 5 
 
 
Latest surveys (including that of FIAS) fail to 
identify these problems because questions are 
not asked and because, when asked, the answers 
add the burden to costs of dealing with the 
government.  Most of our respondents were on 
the opinion that legitimate, bigger and more 
competitive businesses suffer in the first place.  
 
4.3.3. Procedures: how are taxes being paid?  
 
C.1) Corporate tax 
 
As mentioned, in 2005 the corporate income tax 
is reduced to 15% and is flat.  The difference 
between corporate and personal income rates for 
high-end income group (successful managers, 
entrepreneurs, competitive workers, etc.) is 
significant.  There are incentives to 
“corporatize” personal expenditure of those who 
control corporations.  
 
C.2) VAT 
 
1. Almost 90% of VAT revenue accrues at the 
time of import; it is common phenomenon that 
VAT is paid at import but Bulgaria is a rather 
extreme case.  Accrued revenues from domestic 
sources have been negative in some months 
because of refund claims (both domestic and 
export).  VAT revenues are currently about five 
percent (5.6%) of GDP and there are about 
87,000 VAT taxpayers (about 1/3 of the so-
called active firms) 
 
2. As Bob Conrad of the Duke Center for 
International Development (Duke University) 
has discovered: “It appears that the tax 
administration sought to combat fly-by-night 
evasion by attempting to trace transactions down 
the chain of value added (almost on a transaction 
by transaction basis) to determine if appropriate 
VAT had been paid at each point in the process.  
A regulation, promulgated in 2000, allowed the 
tax administration to disallow credit claims for 
otherwise legitimate transactions if fraud was 
deemed to have occurred at a lower, or 
subsequent stage, in the production and 
distribution chain.”5. 
                                                 
5 Robert Conrad, Trip Report Bulgaria. October 2003, p 1 
(unpublished).  In between other conclusions Dr. Conrad 
commented with a pinch of pessimism: “The legal basis for 
this regulation is not clear.  Courts in most countries would 
restrain a tax administration from using such methods.  If 
not the courts, then the taxpayers would make such a public 
outcry about the regulation, with justification I believe, that 
the legislature would likely nullify the tax administration’s 
action.” 
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C.3) Income tax reporting in 2004 and 2005 
(SMEs) 
 
Irrespective of tax obligations, the tax procedure 
burdens employers because they must fill out 
and submit annual tax declarations.  The tax 
declarations are usually filled along with the 
reports to NSI, since for corporations they must 
be submitted by the same deadline.  Sole 
proprietors are supposed do the same but by a 
different deadline.   
 
Even if the declaration and the report are empty 
(the firm or the entrepreneur declare no activity), 
the operation is time consuming.  It is difficult to 
calculate the time spent on filling the tax 
declarations, since it is different from taxpayer 
to taxpayer.  Recently, we measured the time 
spent on signing the report to NSI.  
 
The firm (sole proprietor) ID number must be 
filled in 33 times in the NSI form; the tree names 
of the owner (manager) and the person who 
filled the report (usually the accountant) 22 
times each (irrespectively whether it is one and 
the same person), and the contact person’s 
names – 22 times, although it is usually either 
the owner, the manager or the accountant.  The 
manager and the accountant must sign 50 times.  
For the economy as a whole, this means 124,000 
days spent annually on signing NSI forms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Readers of IME materials, 
 
If you would like to be a part of economic freedom dissemination in Bulgaria and the world, and help 
elaboration and advocacy of market-based solutions to challenges citizens of Bulgaria and the region face, 
you can support the Institute for Market Economics by making a donation for: 
 
1) An article – 100 BGL 
2) The new book “Low Taxes in Bulgaria” – 250 BGL 
3) IME bulletins – 500 BGL 
4) IME WebPages - www.easibulgaria.org, www.ria-studies.net, www.competitiveness.bg - 500 
BGL 
5) IME Mission – over 500 BGL 
 
If you are paying taxes in Bulgaria, 83% of the donation is tax-deductible. For more information please 
write to svetlak@ime.bg. 
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